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Who Can Challenge the Settlement of an
Employment Discrzmination Suit?










This case presents the question of whether individu-
als who did not intervene in employment discrimination
litigation may challenge a consent order promoting mi-
nority police officers with the same or lower promotion
examination scores than those of nonminority police
officers.
FACTS
In 1983 and 1984, the New York City Police Depart-
ment (NYCPD) gave civil service examinations to nearly
12,000 police officers who were seeking promotion to
the rank of sergeant. Of the candidates for promotion,
79 per cent were white, 12.3 per cent were black and 8.7
per cent were Hispanic. After scoring the examination,
the NYCPD established a cut-off that left 1,041 officers
eligible for promotion-93 per cent of whom were
white, 2.3 per cent of whom were black and 4.2 per cent
Hispanic.
In late 1984, two groups representing black and
Hispanic police officers-the Guardians Association and
the Hispanic Society-filed separate suits in federal dis-
trict court to prevent the eligibility list from being used
in selecting officers for promotion. They alleged that
the examination and the eligibility list it produced were
not job-related and had a disparate impact on black and
Hispanic officers. The NYCPD promptly agreed not to
use the eligibility list as a basis for permanent promo-
tions pending outcome of the litigation. The NYCPD
then received approval from the court to make provi-
sional promotions of 534 officers from the eligibility list.
Jay E. Grenig is a Professor of Law at Marquette University
Law School, 1103 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, WI
53233; telephone (414) 224-3799.
Three groups then intervened in the lawsuit: the
Sergeants Benevolent Association, on behalf of officers
who had been provisionally promoted to the rank of
sergeant from the eligibility list; the Sergeants Eligibles
Association, on behalf of those officers who had not
been provisionally promoted but who remained on the
eligibility list; and a group called the "Schneider interve-
nors," on behalf of certain white ethnic groups and
other individuals who had not been promoted and who
had taken the examination but were not on the eligibility
list.
These three groups, the two plaintiff groups and the
NYCPD attempted to negotiate a settlement of the law-
suits. Ultimately, the suits were consolidated and all
parties except the Schneider intervenors agreed to the
terms of a settlement. The proposed settlement pro-
vided for permanent promotion of all officers on the
eligibility list as well as a sufficient number of black and
Hispanic officers so that each group would be promoted
to sergeant in proportion to the number of those taking
the civil service examination. The parties proposed to
select these additional black and Hispanic officers on the
basis of their scores on the written portion of the civil
service examination.
In 1985, the court gave its interim approval to the
proposed settlement, allowing 573 more officers of
whom 160 were not on the eligibility list to receive provi-
sional promotions to the rank of sergeant.
Approximately one month later, two groups, re-
ferred to as the Marino petitioners and the Costello
petitioners, filed suit against various city officials. The
groups represented white officers who were not on the
eligibility list, but who had examination scores at least as
high as the lowest scoring minority officer receiving a
provisional promotion under the interim settlement
order. The Marino petitioners alleged that the provi-
sional promotions made pursuant to the settlement ord-
ers violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Marino petitioners asked
that members of their class be promoted to current and
future sergeant vacancies.
Thereafter, the district court dismissed the lawsuit by
the Marino petitioners and it approved the entry of a
consent order in the Hispanic Society litigation. The Ma-
rino petitioners and Costello petitioners appealed the
action, but the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of
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the Marino petitioner's complaint as an impermissible
collateral attack on the Hispanic Society settlement (806
F.2d 1144 (1986)). It also ruled that the Costello peti-
tioners had no right to file an appeal because they had
not formally intervened in the Hispanic Society litigation.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
This case raises important questions concerning the
rights and obligations of persons whose interests may be
affected by, but who are not party to, ongoing litigation
under federal employment discrimination laws. The
courts have struggled to find the proper role for nonmi-
nority employees in employment discrimination lawsuits
brought by their minority colleagues. The Supreme
Court here has the opportunity to define the proper
procedures for employees, allegedly aggrieved by a con-
sent order settling an employment discrimination law-
suit and establishing an affirmative action plan, to
challenge the consent order.
Some courts, including the Second Circuit in this
case, have taken the position that intervention in an
employment discrimination lawsuit is the only proce-
dure available for litigating the question of the validity
of the consent order. This is referred to as "mandatory
intervention." ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Bren-
nan have previously criticized mandatory intervention
and at least one federal court of appeal has rejected the
doctrine.
Although this case presents several complex and dif-
ficult procedural issues, the case represents yet another
chapter in the ongoing struggle to determine when and
under what conditions the courts may grant relief in an
employment discrimination suit that treats racial minori-
ties differently than nonminorities.
If the Supreme Court upholds the Second Circuit's
decision, this will encourage voluntary settlements of
employment discrimination suits, and minimize the pos-
sibility of further litigation and the possibility of incon-
sistent results. However, because of strict rules
concerning timeliness of intervention and application of
the collateral attack doctrine, such a decision may leave
many interested third persons without an opportunty to
be heard.
ARGUMENTS
For Evelyn Marino and Wayne Costello (Counsel of Record,
Ronald Podolsky, Fifteen Park Row, New York, NY 10038;
telephone (212) 460-8218)
1. Marino and Costello were denied equal protection
because the racial remedy employed was not suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored to prevent unnecessarily ex-
cluding them from the rank of sergeant.
2. Marino and Costello were necessary parties to the
Hispanic Society litigation under Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. The Marino suit was not an impermissible collateral
attack on the Hispanic Society consent order.
4. The Costello petitioners had standing to appeal.
For the Sergeants Benevolent Association of the City of
New York (Counsel of Record, Richard K. Walker, 1200
Seventeenth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036; telephone
(202) 857-9800)
1. The court of appeals correctly held that, as nonpar-
ties to the Hispanic Society case, Marino and Costello
lacked standing to appeal.
2. The Marino suit was properly dismissed as an imper-
missible collateral attack upon the settlement in His-
panic Society and the orders implementing it.
3. Marino and Costello do not have standing to chal-
lenge the consent decree because the promotions of
others inflicted no redressable injury on them.
For New York City (Counsel of Record, Peter L. Zimroth, 100
Church Street, New York, NY 10007; telephone (212) 566-
6037)
1. Marino 4nd Costello were aware of the existence of
their claim, knew of the Hispanic Society litigation,
were advised to move to intervene and warned that if
they did not intervene their claim would be pre-
cluded. Because they deliberately chose to appear at
the Hispanic Society settlement hearing and present
their claim without moving to intervene, Marino and
Costello may not pursue a separate lawsuit attacking a
Title VII consent decree.
2. Because Marino and Costello were not a party to the
Hispanic Society litigation and they deliberately chose
not to intervene, they cannot appeal the entry of the
consent decree.
3. Marino and Costello have not been passed over for a
promotion they were entitled to, because if there had
been no employment discrimination litigation, they
would not have been promoted and the consent de-
cree does not alter their status.
For the Guardians Association of the Police Department of
the City of New York, Inc. (Counsel of Record, Robert David
Goodstein, 56 Harrison Street, New Rochelle, NY 10801;
telephone (914) 632-8382)
1. Marino and Costello are "jealous" whites-jealous
because other failing test takers were promoted solely
to undo the disparate impact of a racially discrimina-
tory test.
For the Hispanic Society (Counsel of Record, Kenneth
Kimerling, 99 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10013; tele-
phone (212) 219-3360)
1. The Marino complaint was correctly dismissed as an
improper collateral attack and because the Marino
petitioners lack standing.
2. The Costello petitioners are not necessary parties to
Issue No. 4 111
the Hispanic Society litigation under Rule 19 of the
Federal Rules of Procedure.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of Neither Party
The United States Department of Justice filed a brief
arguing that the Marino petitioners who failed to inter-
vene in the Hispanic Society suit are nevertheless entitled
to pursue an action challenging the employment-related
orders entered in the original suit. It also argues that the
Costello petitioners who did not move to make them-
selves a formal party to the Hispanic Society suit are not
entitled to appeal the entry of a consent decree in that
litigation.
In Support of Evelyn Marino and Wayne Costello
New York Assemblyman Dov Hikind and The Citi-
zens' Crusade Against Crime filed an amicus brief con-
tending that the courts' current insistence on imposing
affirmative action quotas to accomplish statistical
equality among racial and ethnic groups in employment
exacerbates the social and juridical problems they seek
to solve. They also argue that a "well-meaning but obsti-
nate unwillingness to face the reality that statistical dif-
ferences in performance are not the necessary product
of discrimination and have not been eliminated by quo-
tas has led to procustean solutions like that imposed in
this case, in which passing scores for 'minority' appli-
cants are shaped to meet the ability of the job applicants
instead of to meet the needs of thejob."
In Support of Juan Ortiz and the New York City Police
Department
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law; the City of Birmingham, Alabama; the Equal Em-
ployment Advisory Council; the National League of
Cities, the National Governors' Association; the U. S.
Conference of Mayors; the International City Manage-
ment Association; and the National Association of
Counties
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